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Abstract. 
Access to Space for small R&D payloads is one of the key enablers for innovative space technology development.  
For a vibrant space R&D environment to exist space access needs to be available on a regular basis at a cost 
commensurate with R&D program budgets and with a minimum of custom interface requirements.  The United 
States has a long heritage of developing new technologies for space applications, enabled by numerous space 
launches in the early 1960s.  Many space experiments are launched as secondary payloads due to their relatively 
small mass and modest program budgets.  NASA and DoD have organized processes to evaluate and select 
experimental payloads for space access (such as the DOD Space Test Program’s SERB).  The payload interfaces are 
usually custom-made for each payload and are scheduled on a case-by-case basis depending on primary payload 
excess margins and acceptance of secondary payloads.  The International space community has taken a dramatically 
different approach since the early 1990s with the introduction of a regularly scheduled standardized launch interface 
for secondary payloads – the Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payloads (ASAP).  Nearly 30 free-flyer secondary 
payloads have been launched from ASAP since its introduction over 10 years ago.  In comparison, the US STP 
program has only launched an average of 1 free-flyer per year since its inception in 1965.  Is this disparity in 
secondary payload launch rates a cause for concern for the US space R&D community?  Is the US losing ground to 
the International space community as a leader in the introduction of new space technologies?  Regularly available 
space access is a key factor in the rapid introduction of new space technologies.  If a country such as the US is 
experiencing a slower rate of experimental payload launches compared to the International community, then the US 
may be at risk of losing its leadership role in space technology.  This paper will explore the background history, 
supporting data and space access capabilities necessary to evaluate such a concern.  The paper will propose potential 
approaches to improve the US capability for support of space R&D.    
 
1.0 Background 
 
The current US approach to space test involves a 
tightly coupled loop of risk averse (higher reliability) 
processes driving higher launch/payload costs which 
leads to fewer missions.  Such an environment 
discourages space research payloads.  Because there 
are fewer missions, the pressure for success on each 
mission increases and the risk-averse environment 
becomes more conservative spiraling the space test 
process downward or directly opposite to what is 
needed for a healthy research and development 
environment.  Downward is used here to describe a 
direction that is away from a high frequency, rapid 
turnaround space test process environment.  This 
downward spiral was well described by Sellers and 
Milton.1 
 
In order to reverse this downwardly spiraling process, 
the paradigm of space testing needs to be changed 
dramatically to encourage more frequent low-cost 
space experiments.  A new paradigm would have to 
accept risk as part of the R&D space payload launch 
process.  The cost of failure would be mitigated by 
the lower cost of testing and the smaller size of 
higher-risk test payloads.  The process would achieve 
dramatic benefits from more frequent iterations of the 
development cycle, even when failure occurs.   Space 
test programs have almost forgotten that failure 
should be an integral part of any research program.  
Secondary payload risk must be balanced against the 
overall risk allowable by the primary payload.  There 
are approaches available to address secondary 
payload risk minimization prior to launch vehicle 
separation. 
 
Jim Wertz presented his overview of this new 
paradigm in  a 2001 paper2, summarized in the Figure 
1 below.  The first “Circle” in this graphic depicts 
where the US space test program is now, taken from 
Sellers and Milton.  The second “Circle” in the 
graphic depicts where we need to be in the US Space 
Test Program as suggested by Wertz. 
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If the lower circle defines the desired process, then 
how do we get there?  This paper attempts to provide 
answers through a series of focused questions, such 
as: 
• Are there any specific impediments to Space 
R&D (why is Space R&D so difficult)? 
• Does the rest of the International Space 
Industry perform space R&D in a similar 
manner? 
• What is the business case for the US 
Aerospace Industry 
• Is this a case of solutions looking for 
problems? 
• Who is interested in Space R&D? 
• Where can the Space Market Grow? 
• What are the current launch opportunities? 
• What’s the next step? (and a Sample 
Process) 
• What is the Incentive? 
• Summary – or Where do We go from Here? 
 
2.0 Why is Space R&D Difficult? 
 
Compared to ground or even airborne research and 
development processes, space R&D has a number of 
unique constraints that make it more difficult to 
conduct.  Included are: 
• Costs are high ($10-20K per pound to LEO) 
• Frequency of testing is low 
• Opportunities for small payloads to achieve 
desired orbits are few and far between 
• Delays between payload development and 
launch can be measured in years, not 
months.   
 
The last factor alone would be unacceptable for any 
ground-based R&D program.   
 
Space R&D is not unlike ground based R&D in the 
basic approach.  Both follow the Scientific Method: 
1) Observe a phenomena, 2) Develop a hypothesis on 
how it occurs, 3) Test the hypothesis, 4) Repeat until 
test agree with actual phenomena.  Experiments are 
developed based on observations and are often 
developed before launch opportunities are defined or 
obtained.  R&D payloads are launched as 
“piggyback” on other missions/launch vehicles, often 
resulting in a non-optimum orbit.  Secondary 
payloads are ejected from launch vehicle after the 
primary payload is delivered and have to accept the 
primary payload orbit.   
 
Embedded experiments that are part of a larger R&D 
spacecraft seldom achieve orbits that are optimum for 
R&D mission.  R&D payloads seldom have onboard 
propulsion for orbit adjustments once they are 
deployed from the primary launch vehicle (to 
minimize risk).  Launch vehicle failures can “wipe 
out” years of payload development effort, which 
discourages testing of high-risk concepts in space.  
Putting this in the context of the scientific method, 
the Table 1 below provides a comparison of ground 
and space-based R&D.  Space R&D is truly harder 
than ground-based R&D 
Figure 1 – Changing the Space R&D Process
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3.0 Comparison of US to International Space 
R&D 
 
It could be useful to look at how Space R&D is done 
outside of the US and determine if it is being done 
better or worse than in the US.  The parallel issue is 
whether we are losing ground to the International 
Community in our ability to do R&D in Space. 
If the same constraints for space R&D exist for the 
US and International space industries, then why 
would we expect any differences in their respective 
space R&D performance records.  Turning this 
thought around, if there are differences in their 
performance records, then the differences in the 
program approaches for US and International space 
R&D could be illuminating.   Let’s take a look at the 
records of two prominent space test programs, the 
DoD Space Test Program (STP) and the European 
Space Agency (ESA) Ariane Auxiliary Structure for  
Secondary Payloads (ASAP).  Table 2 summarizes 
each of these programs and indicates that ASAP has a 
nearly 240% better record in launching free-flyer 
secondary payloads than STP.3   
 
 
Why is Ariane apparently doing a much better job at 
launching their payloads?  Many papers have been 
written on this subject, but there is general agreement 
that the regularly scheduled and frequent availability 
of standardized secondary payload launch interfaces, 
at a reasonable cost, are the basis for their 
significantly better R&D payload launch record than 
US programs.  The recent approval by the European 
Space Agency (ESA) to “finance the infrastructure 
that will be needed to launch Russian-built Soyuz 
rockets from Europe’s spaceport in South America 
(French Guiana)” could further enhance ESA’s 
competitive position for launch of primary and 
secondary payloads. 4  
 
4.0 Where is the Business Case? 
 
Then what is the problem?  The US continues to 
conduct space R&D, but at a slower rate than the 
international community.  Many business textbooks 
stress that the organization that can get to market 
STP started in 1965
• Launched 37 Free-Flyer 
Missions to Date (thru ’02)
• Rate of 1 per year
• Custom Interface
• Ad-hoc launch 
opportunities
• Cost subsidized by DoD
• Strong success story in 
DoD spacecraft heritage
– Milstar
– DSCS
– GPS
– DMSP
– DSP
ASAP First Launch in 1990
• Launched 26 Free-Flyer 
Missions to Date (thru ’00)
• Rate of 2.36 per year
• Standard Interface
• Scheduled launch 
opportunities
• Costs within reach of small 
research organizations
• ASAP has “bootstrapped” 
several small countries into 
the space business
– South Korea
– Portugal
– South Africa
Table 2.  Comparison of Launch Records
• Iteration cycle 
in years
• Iteration cycle 
in days to 
weeks
4. Iterate 3 & 4 
until data matches 
hypothesis
• Very difficult, 
costly, and 
done remotely
• Straightforward 
and “hands-on”
3. Test   
Hypothesis
• Develop based 
on limited 
observations
• Develop based 
on Many 
observations
2. Develop 
Hypothesis
• Difficult in 
situ – often 
done remotely
• Straightforward    
in situ
1. Observe
R&D in  
Space
R&D on the 
Earth
Scientific 
Method
Table 1. Why Space R&D is harder than ground-based R&D
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sooner with more innovative products has a higher 
chance of market leadership in the long run.  Not all 
of the attempts will result in success, but failure is 
also a great teacher.  This worked for the US in the 
60s and 70s.  An industry leading organization won’t 
maintain its dominant position without continuous 
infusion of new products and capabilities.  In 
contrast, a start-up organization that conducts 
frequent product development activities with an 
iteration cycle between failure and the revised 
approach that is sufficiently short can take away 
market share from the incumbent organization.  This 
is because such an organization that accepts failure as 
part of the R&D process can outperform a risk-averse 
or mature organization and introduce better products 
to the market more frequently.   
 
A typical business cycle for introduction of a new 
product is shown in figure 2 below.  Rapid growth 
occurs during the initial startup phase if the product 
has market viability.  Once introduced, the product 
transitions to the “cash-cow” phase of the business 
cycle and a company gets a return on its R&D 
investment.  If the next generation of product is 
started up before the “cash cow” phase ends on the 
previous product, then an organization can establish 
market position and possibly maintain market 
dominance.   
What differentiates the competent organization from 
the market leader is their ability to continually inject 
new and profitable products into this business cycle, 
at a faster rate than the competition.  Not all new 
products or startup organizations succeed, but those 
that do form the basis for a new product line and, in 
some cases, an entire new industry.  Risk -averse 
organizations can be profitable, but they cannot 
maintain positions as industry leaders.  Market 
growth is “spurred” by innovation and new ideas.   
 
Should the US be worried about its relative position 
in the International  Aerospace Industry?  The 
recently completed Presidentially appointed 
Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace 
Industry had a specific charter of addressing this 
point in several areas.  The bottom line is that we 
have a significant problem – US leadership is eroding 
in the International Aerospace Industry. But if we 
have a problem, they why isn’t the US Aerospace 
Industry aggressively pursuing solutions?  More 
specifically, why don’t they increase the rate of space 
R&D to gain back eroding market share and return us 
to a position of dominance?  The problem may lie in 
the risk-averse nature of the US Aerospace Industry, 
which hinders their ability to introduce innovation 
and new technologies at a rate sufficient to maintain 
market share.  Much of our US Space Industry is 
content to “ride out” the cash cow phase of the 
business cycle, oblivious to the approaching business 
cliff.  If the solution, introduction of a more 
aggressive space R&D program, is so obvious, then 
why isn’t it being implemented? 
 
5.0 Solution Looking for a Problem? 
 
A number of business development training programs 
and textbooks point out that you can’t sell something 
to a customer unless you are solving their problem(s).  
If you haven’t identified the customer with a problem 
that fits your solution, then you don’t have any 
chance of a successful “sale”. In many cases, the 
potential customers are not even aware that they have 
a problem, so there is an educational process 
involved in identifying the problem for the customer 
before a solution (your solution hopefully) can be 
proposed.  This may sound like “motherhood and 
apple pie”, but it is a fundamental fact of business 
development that is often overlooked.  To put this in 
context, why would a primary launch provider want 
R&D Innovation Mature Business (cash cow)
Time
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to add a secondary payload adapter that would not 
pay for itself and would introduce more risk for the 
primary (and paying) payload(s).  Why would a 
government research organization want to develop its 
own secondary payload launch adapter if it had other 
less costly ways of obtaining one-off launch 
opportunities for its unique test payloads? 
 
As a frequent participant in the annual AIAA/USU 
Smallsat conference, I’ve asked myself the question, 
“If there is such a vibrant source of new ideas and 
innovation at the Smallsat conference, why don’t we 
see more of these new ideas in space hardware?”  
Many of you may have asked similar questions and 
many have probably come up with the most probable 
answer:  Lack of access to space for small, innovative 
payloads is a major impediment to Space R&D.  It 
brings most new concepts to a screeching halt or at 
best relegates them to years on the shelf before a 
launch is identified.   
 
Let’s discuss the innovation cycle described in the 
beginning of the paper.  Rapid low cost space 
experiments with frequent launches on shorter 
schedules leads to higher performance, lower cost, 
more reliable space systems.  What’s missing from 
this triad?  The answer is the lack of space access 
(more space experiments launched on shorter 
schedules).   Many designs and multiple business 
approaches have been developed and implemented to 
address the lack of space access for small, innovative 
payloads.  One Stop Satellite Solutions (OS cubed) is 
one of the more recent examples that many of you are 
familiar with.  Their solution to the lack of US small 
payload launch opportunities was to develop a 
multiple payload launch adapter on a Russian launch 
vehicle.  Great idea, but many of the US payloads ran 
into problems with export of technology restrictions 
imposed by US ITAR (International Trade in Arms 
Regulations).  The ITAR approval process 
overwhelmed the payload integration and launch 
process.   
 
If innovation is to grow in the US at a rate that will 
maintain (or even regain) our leadership in space 
technology, then I maintain that the launch capability 
for small, innovative payloads must be resident in the 
US and readily available (schedule and cost) to small 
R&D organizations and university research 
programs.  Anything less will not suffice. 
 
So why aren’t the US launch primes sufficiently 
interested to implement a regularly scheduled small 
payload launch interface?  I used the words 
“sufficiently interested” because there are examples 
of standardized US launch vehicle secondary payload 
interfaces.  Delta II is one of the most prominent and 
one of the most prolific for NASA and DoD 
payloads.  The Delta II secondary payload 
performance is summarized in section 8.0.   Why 
aren’t the current EELV launch vehicle companies 
(Lockheed Martin for Atlas V and Boeing for Delta 
IV) interested in providing an ASAP-like (ASAP is 
the ESA Ariane Auxiliary Structure for Secondary 
Payloads) launch interface?  The answer is simple – it 
does not make a good business case, and in their view 
it would create potential risk for the primary payload. 
 
The difficulty lies in identifying the organization(s) 
who have problems that can be solved by 
implementing a new, standardized, regularly 
scheduled secondary payload launch interface.   
 
6.0 Where can the Space market grow? 
 
There are many technology applications and orbital 
regions yet to be explored and applied.  One example 
is in the highly elliptical orbit belt that is currently 
underutilized.  Novel elliptical orbits have been 
designed by individuals such as John Draim that 
provide the continuous coverage of GEO with only a 
few MEO satellites.5 A major problem is that the 
satellites will have to regularly survive passage 
through the Van Allen belt.  Why not develop a more 
thorough knowledge of the radiation environment by 
“seeding” the belt with numerous small instruments 
that can conduct measurements and/or test 
components until failure.  This could provide the 
stimulus to open up a whole new segment of 
commercial-service satellites for services such as 
Broadband data.  Launching “clouds” of small 
satellites to instrument the Van Allen Belt would 
require a secondary payload launcher interface.  This 
could be the “first user” application to pave the way 
for regular secondary launch opportunities. 
 
NASA Goddard’s Living With a Star Program 
advocates research such as this and was very 
receptive to initial discussions on the use of 
radiation-measuring smallsats de-orbited from a GTO 
launch capability.  Their program, summarized 
below, could be the basis for development of a 
standardized interface.  The only thing lacking is 
funding.  Figure 3 below summarizes the NASA 
GSFC Living With a Star Program.6 
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7.0 Who are the Interested Parties? 
 
The primary launch providers (Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin) will be the principal interface for the 
payloads, either directly or through a payload 
interface/broker organization.  This would lead most 
to believe that the primary launch providers are the 
organizations most interested in providing secondary 
launch capabilities.  The opposite is true.  Launch 
providers do not see a business case for small, 
secondary payloads and are seldom willing to accept 
the risk introduced by adding secondary payloads 
onto a primary launch.  So if the launch providers 
aren’t the interested parties, then who is?   Herein lies 
the problem.  Many proponents of standardized 
secondary payload adapters feel that the launch 
providers should “step up to the plate” and build 
these interfaces.  They have not looked beyond the 
obvious relationship of payload to launch provider to 
realize that they are addressing the wrong audience.  
The real organizations that need to be addressed are 
the ones that are concerned with the erosion of US 
Space technological leadership, the reduction in a 
trained US space workforce, and the shrinking role of 
the US in the international space marketplace.  These 
organizations provide the best opportunities for 
advocacy.  Advocacy without funding is a hollow 
victory.   The best “targets” are those organizations 
that have a vested interest and have funding “clout”.  
These are the “Big Gorilla” organizations.  More 
discussion is provided on how to deal with the “Big 
Gorillas” in a later section.   
 
8.0 What are the potential Launch Opportunities 
 
The Secondary Payload launch process in the US is 
essentially ad-hoc – there are no standardized launch 
interfaces available on a regularly scheduled basis.  
Table 4 below summarizes launch vehicles and 
launch methods/agents available in the US for 
placing secondary payloads into orbit. 
Figure 3. The NASA/GSFC Living With a Star Program
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 Delta II qualifies as the most prolific small, 
secondary payload launcher – and comes the closest 
in the US inventory to ESA’s Ariane IV in providing 
a standardized secondary payload launch interface.  
Table 5 below summarizes the Delta II performance 
record for small, secondary payload launches. The 
only problem is that the Delta II production line is 
closing out and few opportunities remain for its use 
as a secondary payload launch vehicle.  NASA has 
the orders for the bulk of the remaining Delta II 
Launches.  
  
 
9.0 Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
Summarizing the current state of the US Space 
Industry and more specifically, the US Space R&D 
Industry, one can come to the following conclusions: 
• The pace of US space R&D is falling behind 
that of the International Space Community  
• Ariane ASAP is outperforming STP 
• Several Concepts exist for new, standardized 
interfaces for secondary payloads 
• Many US launches have excess capacity 
• There is no incentive for the US Launch 
industry to introduce secondary payload 
capabilities 
• Payload Managers would rather not 
complicate their primary missions by adding 
secondary payloads 
To break this downwardly spiraling trend in US 
Space R&D it will take a Government “Big Gorilla” 
to step up to the plate.  What or Who Is this “Big 
Gorilla” organization?  It should have many of the 
following characteristics: 
 
• an organization chartered to do high-risk, 
high payoff space R&D  
• willing to change the space R&D paradigm 
by implementing new payload interfaces for 
secondary payloads 
• possessing the funding authority to 
implement the needed changes 
• having a charter or objectives that can 
support small R&D payload launches 
 
SECONDARY 
PAYLOAD LAUNCH DATE
LAUNCH 
SITE
PRIMARY 
PAYLOAD
LOSAT-X July 3, 1991 CCAFS Navstar II-11
DUVE July 24, 1992 CCAFS Geotail
SEDS-1 March 29, 1993 CCAFS GPS-1
PMG June 26, 1993 CCAFS GPS-3
SEDS-2 March 9, 1994 CCAFS GPS-6
SURFSAT November 4, 1995 VAFB Radarsat
SEDSAT October 24, 1998 CCAFS Deep Space 1
Ørsted, SUNSAT February 23, 1999 VAFB P91-1 ARGOS
Munin November 21, 2000 VAFB EO-1/SAC-C 
Table 5. Delta II Launch Record for Secondary Payloads7
Launch Vehicles
– Piggyback on EELVs
• Delta, Atlas, Titan
– Dedicated Small 
Launcher
• Pegasus, Taurus, 
Athena
– Shuttle
• Getaway Specials 
(GASCAN)
• Payload bay attach 
points/launchers
• Cross-deck payload 
attachments (Spartan)
Methods / Agents
– USAF/DOD Space 
Test Program (STP)
• SERB (Space 
Experiments 
Review Board) 
process to 
prioritize and 
select payloads
– University launches
– NASA
• Small Explorer, 
Shuttle
Table 4. Launch Vehicles and Methods
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Once the capability of a regularly scheduled, 
standardized interface and reasonable cost secondary 
payload launch capability is made available on a 
regular basis, the US Space R&D community will 
respond with multiple payloads for space testing. 
 
The approach is clear: identify the “Big Gorilla” first 
user and develop a multiple small satellite launch 
concept that becomes the solution to a problem 
(current or unstated).  Then convince the “Big 
Gorilla” to fund the program as a solution to their 
problem.  Sounds simple, but then why hasn’t it been 
accomplished by now?  The answer may lie in the 
inability of innovative organizations to articulate 
their concepts so that the “Big Gorillas” will support 
their programs.   As a hypothetical approach, let’s 
walk through a process with a potential customer.   
 
10.0 A Sample Process 
 
Big Gorilla:  DARPA – a “venture capital” 
organization for defense R&D 
Problem to be solved:  DARPA seeks innovative 
technologies for tactical space applications.   
Most projects are mission oriented, but some 
component development activities exist that have 
needs for space experiments to measure 
environments and qualify component 
performance in space.  Space access is a 
common thread for all DARPA space R&D 
programs 
Current Solution:  DARPA uses the DOD Space 
Test Program for space testing needs and also 
pursues ad-hoc opportunities for space launch.  
DARPA does not currently perceive a lack of 
launch opportunities for their planned payloads 
(i.e. where is the problem?).  Also, they are not 
at the stage of exploring new concepts that 
would utilize smallsats on a regular basis where 
they would need to plan for regularly scheduled 
small payload launch opportunities. 
What should be done:  Educate DARPA on 
potential new missions for smallsats, and once 
they agree on the need, develop a smallsat 
program that requires a multiple payload launch 
adapter.  Do not expect DARPA to develop a 
secondary payload adapter in the absence of a 
“DARPA-hard” technology challenge.   
 
 
 
11.0 What is the Incentive 
 
Why should the US Space R&D community and the 
larger US Space industry be concerned about the lack 
of opportunities for space R&D?  To answer the 
question, it must be posed in terms of the economic 
impact on the US, the relative performance of the US 
Space industry in the international community, and 
the effect on the trained US aerospace workforce.  If I 
told you that an industry exists that provides return 
on investments lower than government bonds and is 
shrinking in market share (from a once dominant 
position in the International market place), then what 
would your prediction be for the future of this 
industry?  Continued growth and a return to 
dominance?  Most, if not all of you would predict 
exactly the opposite.  The US Aerospace industry is 
currently in the situation described above.   
 
To put some factual “teeth” into this generalized 
example recent statistics on the state of the US 
Aerospace Industry were generated.   The 
Presidential Commission on the Future of the US 
Aerospace Industry completed their 12-month 
assessment last fall and issued their findings in 
November 2002 [insert reference].   The panel was 
made up of 12 very senior experts in areas across a 
broad range of factors involved in the US Aerospace 
Industry.  Included were former Congressmen, an 
astronaut, a former Secretary of Defense and senior 
financial analysts.  Heidi Woods, the panel member 
leading the “financial” analysis area presented some 
sobering statistics on the financial state of the US 
Aerospace industry.  Figure 4 below summarizes 
relative market performance of several industries 
over a common period.  Near the bottom of the stack 
is the US Aerospace/Defense Industry, with a 
MINUS 2.0 percent return over a 5-year period.8  Is 
there a problem here?  In addition to the poor 
financial returns, the labor pool of new engineers and 
scientists is eroding (some would say disappearing) 
in the US Aerospace Industry.  Development of a 
more vibrant Space R&D environment may be a key 
factor in recruiting more talent into this diminishing 
workforce.  The Aerospace Commission addressed 
both factors of the dwindling labor pool and low 
profit margins.  Specific recommendations were 
proposed in their final report, including increases in 
the incentives (profits) for large Aerospace 
Companies to support R&D activities.    
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Daniel Baker, Director of the Laboratory for 
Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of 
Colorado, Boulder, recently stated: “The continuing 
vitality of the U.S. space research program is strongly 
dependent on having cost-effective, reliable and 
readily available access to space.  The lack of 
availability of a wide range of sub-orbital and orbital 
flight capabilities severely hinders the ability of the 
solar and space physics research community to carry 
out leading-edge science programs, validate new 
instruments and train new scientists.”9 He went on to 
state: “Small spacecraft missions can be extremely 
productive scientifically and can also provide a fertile 
training ground for students of science and 
engineering.”…”To push back the frontiers of 
science, to train the next generation of scientists and 
engineers, and to help enable small, focused space 
missions we need access to space that is 
commensurate in cost with the payloads we are 
capable of building.  The United States should use 
every method at our disposal to make this access to 
space a reality.” 
 
Where do the small R&D payloads “fit” into the 
overall Aerospace Industry?  I maintain that they are 
the foundation of future space capabilities. Without 
them, there will be no new space technologies and 
the current space capabilities will be overtaken by 
newer and more effective approaches.  Daniel 
Baker’s comments above echo this sentiment for the 
space R&D community.  To put this in the context of 
a business life cycle, if new ideas and innovations are 
not constantly being “incubated”, then there is a cliff 
at the end of the business “cash cow” cycle that 
marks the demise of an industry.  Competitors who 
have a better solution, as shown in figure 2 will 
almost always overtake a mature industry. 
 
If we maintain a business as usual approach to Space 
R&D, then that is exactly where the US space 
industry is headed.  Maybe this is just a natural 
evolution of technology cycles, like the Steam Age or 
Consumer Electronics. I for one certainly hope not 
when it comes to the US Space Industry.   
 
11.0 Summary:  Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
The key points in this paper are: 
 
We have a declining Space Industry in the US that 
does not conduct a sufficient level of space R&D to 
remain competitive in the International Space 
Marketplace.  A major impediment to space R&D in 
the US is the lack of regularly available, scheduled 
space access opportunities for R&D (secondary) 
payloads.  In order to correct the problem we need to: 
 
1. Identify the “Big Gorillas” with funding 
and/or clout 
2. You can’t sell something to someone unless 
you are solving their problem(s) 
3. Problem identification can be used to focus 
on selected organizations – with funding 
4. Once the funded organizations are identified 
with the problems requiring smallsat 
solutions, they must be approached in the 
proper manner (proposal, briefing, white 
paper) 
5. If a match is formed between the 
organization’s problem and the proposed 
smallsat solution, then the organization can 
serve as the “first provider” for a 
standardized space access interface 
 
Total Five Year Return on Investment by Sector 
(1997 – 2002)
Value today of $10000 investment made in 1997
The Aerospace Industry must be 
able to attract vital capital at a 
reasonable cost!
Figure 4. Aerospace Commission Comparison of Industry Profit Margins
SSC03-III-1 
Horais 10 17th Annual AIAA/USU   
  Conference  on Small Satellites 
6. Before the first provider has completed a 
successful mission with the standardized 
secondary payload interface, additional 
users and funding organizations need to be 
lined up to capitalize on the new space 
access capability 
 
Where are the primary launch providers in this 
process?   For the “first provider” application, they 
would be paid for all of the non-recurring 
engineering and procedures development to add the 
payload interface to a primary launch mission.  
Beyond the first paid mission there must be a 
business case established to keep the primary launch 
providers interested in and motivated to provide a 
regularly scheduled secondary payload launch 
interface (profit driven, government offsets, first user 
funding for non-recurring) 
 
What are the missions that justify the first user?  Two 
have been discussed in this paper as examples: 
 
• Space radiation environment measurements 
– “seed” the Van-Allen belts with 
measurement instruments from a GTO 
launch – use novel de-orbit techniques to 
tailor the instrument orbits 
 
• Large arrays in space – use constellations of 
small satellites to test our new concepts – 
evaluate the network/comm./position 
measurement issues before implementing in 
larger platforms 
 
Many more mission examples exist among the 
smallsat community.  Let’s get the process rolling!  
I’m more than willing to serve as an interface to 
organizations I support (such as DARPA).  Other 
organizational interfaces are needed.  Time’s a 
wasting…. 
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